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2I. Introduction 
 It is undisputed that the world’s financial markets are becoming increasingly 
international and increasingly integrated.  “How should regulators respond?” is an issue 
that that is hotly contested.  The academic literature debates two competing approaches to 
international securities regulation – “harmonization” and “regulatory competition.”  
Harmonization is the idea that rules and regulations should be standardized across 
countries as much as possible.  Countries may achieve harmonization by ceding 
lawmaking authority to an international body or agency, or alternatively, countries may 
agree to enact similar rules through their normal, domestic rule-promulgating procedures.  
In contrast to the harmonization approach stands the regulatory competition approach.  
Under this model, countries do not coordinate with one another – each country is free to 
enact whatever rules and regulations it chooses. 
 Each approach has its merits.  The main argument for harmonization is that it 
reduces transaction costs.  Absent harmonization, it can be costly for multinational 
corporations to comply with different and perhaps conflicting regulatory regimes.  
Harmonization ameliorates this problem, and in particular, full harmonization eliminates 
the problem completely, as companies only need to comply with one set of regulatory 
requirements.  Harmonization also has other benefits.  Proponents argue that it reduces 
the cost of information, internalizes externalities across jurisdictions, achieves economies 
of scale, enhances the mobility of market participants, and prevents a regulatory “race to 
the bottom.” 
On the other hand, advocates of regulatory competition assert that countries 
should not restrict themselves to a one-size-fits-all approach.  Different countries should 
3be able to enact different laws to accommodate different preferences and experiences.  
The regulatory competition model allows countries to tailor their laws to country-specific 
circumstances.  Additionally, regulatory competition fosters innovation, because 
countries must compete with each other to attract market participants, and they attract 
market participants by offering the most efficient regulatory environment.  Companies 
will choose to issue securities in countries where the regulation is not so strict that the 
cost of compliance is prohibitively high and also where the regulation is also not so lax 
that investors require excessively high returns to compensate for the additional risks they 
bear.  Over time, financial activities will concentrate in countries that provide the “best” 
regulation.  Also, the overall quality of financial markets regulation in the world will 
improve, as regulators learn through experimentation and trial-and-error.1
Amidst the debate between harmonization and regulatory competition, a third 
approach to securities regulation has emerged in recent years – the “equivalence” 
approach to regulation.  Under the equivalence approach, a host country exempts foreign 
firms from certain host country rules when the firms’ home country rules are sufficiently 
similar, or “equivalent.”  The equivalence approach represents a compromise between 
harmonization and regulatory competition.  Like harmonization, equivalence seeks to 
reduce the cost of doing business internationally; like regulatory competition, 
equivalence allows countries to experiment with slightly different rules and regulations.    
 
1 For a flavor of the harmonization-versus-regulatory-competition debate, see, e.g. Uri Geiger, The Case for 
the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in  the  Global Market, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 241 
(1997); Roger Van der Bergh, Regulatory Competition or Harmonization of Laws? Guidelines for the 
European Regulator in THE ECONOMICS OF HARMONIZING EUROPEAN LAW (2002); Roberta Romano, The 
Need for Competition in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION, YALE LAW SCHOOL JOHN M. OLIN 
CENTER FOR STUDIES IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY WORKING PAPER SERIES (2001). 
4This paper proceeds as follows.  Part II defines “equivalence” and discusses three 
different ways to understand the concept.  Part III provides four examples of equivalence: 
(1) U.S. and E.U. accounting standards, (2) E.U. regulation of financial conglomerates, (3) 
U.S. regulation of auditors, and (4) the U.S.-Canada Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure 
System.   
Part IV evaluates the equivalence approach, listing some benefits as well as some 
potential pitfalls.  This portion of the paper demonstrates that like harmonization, 
equivalence lowers transaction costs, but has the added advantage of being more feasible 
and more sensitive to real differences between countries.  The danger, however, is that 
equivalence may diminish investor protection.  Additionally, one problem that is 
sometimes overlooked is that equivalence does not automatically ensure mutual benefit 
or reciprocity.  The principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity are often the basis for 
international cooperation – a country is unlikely to voluntarily yield to the demands of 
another country without some assurance that it will receive some benefit in return.  In the 
case of equivalence, a country is unlikely to recognize another country’s regulations as 
equivalent without some assurance that the other country will reciprocate and recognize 
the first country’s regulations as equivalent.  In the past, regulators failed to recognize 
this problem and ran into difficulties.   More recently, regulators are beginning to address 
these concerns more explicitly, and equivalence is evolving into “equivalence-plus-
reciprocity,” where one country agrees to accept a second country’s regulations as 
equivalent on the condition that the second country also accepts the first country’s 
regulations as equivalent.  Equivalence becomes a bilateral determination rather than a 
unilateral determination. 
5II. The Concept of “Equivalence” 
A. A Working Definition 
 As we shall see, “equivalence” is difficult to define.  The basic idea is that a host 
country exempts foreign firms from certain domestic rules when the home country’s rules, 
to which foreign firms are subject, are sufficiently similar, or “equivalent.”  This 
approach presumes that there are some differences between host country rules and home 
country rules, but to say that the rules are “equivalent” is to say that the disparities are not 
significant.  Hence, equivalence does not mean that two sets of rules are “the same,” only 
that they are “close enough,” or functionally substitutable.  In this sense, equivalence is 
different from full harmonization, which attempts to bring two sets of rules into full 
accordance with one another.  Equivalence demands only partial accordance, such that 
the policy objectives of the host country are adequately served by the regulatory scheme 
of the home country.2
B. The Dominant Understanding 
Equivalence enjoys increasing prevalence largely due to the efforts of European 
regulators.  E.U. regulators tout equivalence as a way to dismantle legal barriers to 
international financial integration, and they apply equivalence widely, both in the cross-
Atlantic context and in the E.U. internal markets context. 
In addition to embracing equivalence themselves, European regulators have 
encouraged their American counterparts to do the same.  In 2004, Alexander Schaub, 
 
2 See Alexander M. Donahue, Equivalence: Not Quite Close Enough for the International Harmonization 
of Environmental Standards, 30 Envtl. L. 363, 367-70 (2000) (discussing “harmonization” and 
“equivalence” in the context of environmental regulations). 
6head of the E.U. Internal Market Directorate-General, testified before the Committee on 
Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives to advocate equivalence as a 
basis for E.U. and U.S. cooperation: 
But what all this comes down to in our view is that convergence 
alone is not the solution. In many cases convergence of details may not be 
practicable, not just between the EU and US, but even intra-EU and 
between States of the US. If we are to go forward, we will have to 
recognize that in some cases what is important is not that we take identical 
approaches, but that we agree that we have broadly equivalent approaches 
and that we share the same goal. 
Before compelling service providers or businesses to comply with 
the full set of local rules – including ones which may even contradict those 
which they are asked to meet in their home jurisdiction – regulators and 
supervisors should follow a “rule of reason” approach. They should ask 
themselves whether the ways in which those companies are regulated in 
their home jurisdiction meet comparable or equivalent prudential and 
investor protection standards to those achieved by local rules. If there is 
indeed equivalence, it would not add to the quality of regulatory protection 
to insist on compliance with local rules; it would simply create an 
unnecessary hurdle to services being offered to those investors. That 
cannot be in the interests of either the EU or the US. 
Working on the basis of equivalence is not an admission of defeat: 
it is a healthy recognition by both sides that there can be more than one 
way to achieve a common objective.  [emphasis added] 3 
In making his case for equivalence, Schaub posits a specific type of relationship 
between “equivalence” and “harmonization” (to be precise, Schaub employs the term 
“convergence,” but this paper treats “harmonization” and “convergence” as 
interchangeable4).  Here, harmonization and equivalence are entirely distinct concepts.  
 
3 Alexander Schaub, DG Internal Market of the European Commission, Testimony before the Committee 
on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (May 13, 2004), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/051304as.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). 
4 Like equivalence, convergence sometimes seems too amorphous an idea to define with precision.  One 
U.S. regulator quipped, “I am not sure I can define ‘convergence,’ but I will know it when I see it. Trust 
me!”  Nevertheless, the regulator ventures the following thought: “Convergence is the movement of two or 
more sets of standards toward each other at a relatively high level, producing identical or nearly identical 
principles of regulatory purpose.”    Roel C. Campos, SEC Comissioner, Convergence and Beyond, Speech 
at the U.S. - Europe Symposium: Program on International Financial Systems, Armonk, N.Y. (November 
15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch111503rcc.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).  
Thus described, convergence seems closely related to the notion of harmonization, which was discussed 
7Harmonization pushes for rules to become similar.  Equivalence allows differences to 
persist.  Though distinct, the harmonization and equivalence can be complementary.  
Harmonization is often a starting point.  In actuality, however, full harmonization is 
rarely possible.  Despite the best efforts of regulators to harmonize, differences between 
regulatory regimes usually remain.  This may be because there is political opposition to 
legal reform, or it may be because the situation is such that it is preferable to converge 
only core principles and to allow slight variations in details.  In such instances, the 
European view is that regulators should shift to the equivalence approach to regulation as 
a substitute for the harmonization approach.  As long as there is broad equivalence 
between two regulatory systems, the host country regulator should defer to home country 
regulation.  Forcing foreign companies to comply with local regulation is unnecessary – it 
would be costly and would not add significantly to investor protection.  On this view, 
equivalence does not represent defeat in the reach for harmonization, but rather it is a 
way to allow different countries to accomplish similar ends, through different means.   
C. A Counterpoint Understanding 
 
Despite the efforts of E.U. regulators, some U.S. regulators remain skeptical about 
equivalence.  To give one example, following the E.U.’s announcement that, unless it 
finds U.S. supervision to be “equivalent” to E.U. supervision, the E.U. will exercise 
supervisory power over U.S. financial conglomerates with subsidiaries in Europe, one 
U.S. regulator retorted, “to the extent that ‘equivalence’ signals an effort to harmonize 
both regulatory regimes, we welcome the effort. To the extent ‘equivalence’ is really a 
 
earlier.  One slight difference may be that convergence may be somewhat broader than harmonization, 
encompassing situations where there is less than full harmonization – situations where regulatory systems 
are harmonized at the level of general principles, but where they diverge at level of specific rules. 
8means of having a ‘co-ordinator’ in the EU evaluate the quality of our regulatory regime, 
we do not think that approach will be productive or add to investor protection.”5 This 
regulator made clear her distrust of the E.U.’s equivalence regime.  And while not all U.S. 
regulators are “anti-equivalence,” there is sizable U.S. opposition that extends beyond the 
financial conglomerates context.  Some U.S. regulators even avoid the term 
“equivalence” whenever possible.  As the foregoing quote illustrates, these regulators 
prefer instead to talk in terms of “harmonization” or “convergence.” 
 More fundamentally, these U.S. regulators express a different view about the 
relationship between “harmonization” and “equivalence” than the European view.  They 
insist that harmonization and equivalence are more alike than distinct – like 
harmonization, equivalence should focus on making rules more similar rather than 
acknowledge persistent differences.  One SEC commissioner wonders whether it ever 
makes sense to think of “equivalence” as distinct from “harmonization,” asking, “[C]an 
you determine that equivalence has occurred if there is no harmonization? In that vein, 
can you reach ‘equivalence’ if you have only a small amount of ‘harmonization?’ If so, 
how much harmonization produces equivalence? And, finally, what exactly is 
‘equivalence’ afterall?”6 Under this interpretation, equivalence cannot substitute for 
harmonization, as Europeans believe, but instead, harmonization produces equivalence.  
In other words, two regimes become “equivalent” after regulators work to make them 
converge.  Conversely, if two dissimilar regulatory schemes never converge, at least to 
some degree, then they can never be equivalent.   
 
5 Annette L. Nazareth, Director, Division of Market Regulation at the SEC, Concerning Certain Pending 
Proposals by the European Commission, Testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, United 
States House of Representatives, May 22, 2002, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/052202tsaln.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). 
6 Campos, supra note 4. 
9So we have two competing understandings of equivalence – the dominant 
understanding that equivalence can sometimes be a substitute for harmonization, and the 
counterpoint understanding that equivalence cannot exist without harmonization.  What is 
the significance of this debate?  What is really at stake here?  On the U.S. side, one 
hypothesis is that some U.S. regulators are worried that the equivalence approach may 
result in less rigorous regulations and less protection for U.S. investors.  These regulators 
are afraid that the U.S. may be forced to accept E.U. regulations as equivalent, when in 
fact, E.U. regulations are too lax.  Before they are willing to defer to E.U. regulation, they 
want to make sure that that E.U. regulation is on par with U.S. regulation – hence, they 
insist on convergence as a prerequisite for equivalence.  Later in this paper, we will 
revisit the issue of investor protection. 
European regulators, in turn, are wary that when U.S. regulators advocate 
“convergence” instead of “equivalence,” what U.S. regulators are really talking about is 
not bilateral compromise, but for the E.U. conform to the U.S. way of regulating.   For 
this reason, the European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services responded to a 
push by the U.S. for convergence between U.S. GAAP and IAS by insisting that, “the 
convergence exercise must be a two way street and it must not be allowed to destabilise 
the IFRS platform in Europe.”7 To rephrase the Commissioner’s concern, if the U.S. 
dominates the convergence project, Europe will view this as an intrusion of European 
regulatory prerogatives.  This is another issue we will revisit – whether convergence is 
 
7 See Charlie McCreevy, EC Strategy on Financial Reporting: Progress on Convergence and Consistency, 
Speech at European Federation of Accountants' (FEE) Seminar on International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) (December 1, 2005), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/750&format=HTML&aged=0&l
anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Mar. 02, 2006). 
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sometimes politically infeasible, because it is perceived as violating national sovereignty, 
and if so, whether equivalence can serve as a second-best alternative. 
 In short, regulators are engaged in a contentious debate over the definition of 
“equivalence.”  This debate is complicated by fundamental disagreements over what the 
practical effects of “equivalence” and “convergence” will be – e.g. whether equivalence 
will result in less investor protection, and whether “convergence” means conforming to 
U.S. regulations.   The remainder of this paper further investigates the concept of 
“equivalence” by examining the advantages and disadvantages of equivalence compared 
to other regulatory approaches.  Part III examines some examples of equivalence, and 
Part IV draws from these specific examples to make some general observations about 
equivalence.  But before turning to these topics, we briefly address a third way of 
understanding equivalence, one which has been articulated by economists and other 
academics, but one which as yet, has not been expressly endorsed by regulators. 
D. A Market-Based Test for Equivalence 
 
Both the dominant understanding and the counterpoint understanding of 
equivalence focus heavily legal similarities and differences.  Both ask questions such as: 
What are the substantive laws in different countries?  Are these substantive laws similar 
or different?  If the substantive laws are similar, is enforcement of laws similar or 
different?  An alternative approach is to focus on economic effects rather than law per se.
Here, the appropriate questions are: How do regulations affect capital markets?  Are these 
effects similar or different?   How do market participants react to the regulations?  Under 
this view, two regulatory regimes that have different legal characteristics may 
nonetheless be “equivalent” if they produce the same economic effects, i.e. capital 
11
markets treat the regimes as interchangeable.  This can be called the market-based test for 
equivalence. 
 One study8 applies the market-based test to compare U.S. Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) with International Accounting Standards (IAS).  The 
precise issue in the study is whether one accounting standard is better than the other in 
terms of reducing information asymmetries.  This study examines firms that traded in 
Germany’s “New Market” during 1999 and 2000.  One listing requirement was that firms 
must prepare and publish annual financial statements in accordance with either IAS or 
U.S. GAAP.  In either case, firms faced the same regulatory environment.  The study 
compares IAS firms and U.S. GAAP firms using various proxies for information 
asymmetry – bid-ask spread, share turnover, analysts forecast dispersion, and IPO 
underpricing.  The study finds that the choice of IAS or U.S. GAAP did not affect 
information asymmetry.  One interpretation (the study suggests a couple) is that IAS and 
U.S. GAAP financial statements are of comparable quality; market participants do not 
distinguish between the two standards.  On this view, one might deem IAS and U.S. 
GAAP to be “equivalent.” 
 This market-based understanding of equivalence has yet to be embraced by 
regulators.  Furthermore, it is not clear that a market-based test always exists – the above 
study, for example, draws from a very unique factual situation, and the study warns 
against generalizing beyond the German New Market context.  Nevertheless, the market-
based understanding is important, because it supplies one possible answer to a question 
that plagues both the dominant understand and the counterpoint understanding – the 
 
8 Christian Leuz, IAS versus US GAAP: Information-Asymmetry Based Evidence from Germany's New 
Market, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH (2003). 
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question “how close is close enough?”  The market-based test response is that two sets of 
rules are “close enough” when they produce the same economic effects in capital markets.   
III. Examples of Equivalence 
 Equivalence is not unique to international finance.  It has long been used in other 
areas of law, such as antitrust law, international trade law and environmental law.  One 
example is from the World Trade Organization Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994.  
During these talks, participants discussed how to regulate food safety and animal and 
plant health.  The resulting Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
recognized that governments have the right to enact sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations, but only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health.  Also, regulations should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate WTO 
member nations where identical or similar conditions prevail.   The Agreement further 
encouraged countries to harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures by using 
international standards where possible.  However, where differences persist, “Members 
shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as equivalent,… if 
the exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its 
measures achieve the importing Member’s appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection” (emphasis added).9 Essentially, the importing country will defer to the 
exporting country’s regulations, if it deems those regulations equivalent to its own.  The 
U.S. ratified and codified this equivalence approach in 19 U.S.C. § 2578a (1994).10 
9 Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). 
10 For a discussion of equivalence in the food and drug law and international trade context, see Linda 
Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmonization, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 692 (1998).  For a 
discussion of equivalence in the environmental law context, see supra note 2. 
13
Securities regulators have borrowed the concept of equivalence and applied it in a 
number of instances.  The following are some examples. 
A. U.S. GAAP and IAS 
 Currently, U.S securities law requires companies to state their financial statements 
in U.S. GAAP, while E.U. law requires that statements be prepared in accordance with 
IAS.  The fact that the U.S. and the E.U employ different, sometimes incompatible 
accounting standards imposes significant costs on companies that issue securities in both 
markets, and there have been several attempts to address this problem.  Through the 
1990s, the SEC sought to ease the requirement on foreign issuers to reconcile their 
foreign financial statements to U.S. GAAP.  Then in 2002, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), the promulgator of U.S. GAAP, and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the standard-setter for IAS, announced the Norwalk 
Agreement, which aimed at reducing differences between IAS and U.S. GAAP.  More 
recently, the European Commission has declared that it will allow U.S. companies to use 
U.S. GAAP in the E.U. if it determines that U.S. GAAP is equivalent to IAS.  The SEC 
also announced a “roadmap,” which may lead to the use of IAS in the U.S.  This section 
discusses these developments in more detail.11 
1. U.S. GAAP in the U.S. 
 
In the U.S., under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC has authority to 
establish accounting principles for businesses under its jurisdiction.  Generally, the SEC 
has allowed the accounting profession and the private sector to self-regulate the 
 
11 This section draws from Stavros Gkantinis, IFRS and US GAAP: Convergence and Equivalence (2005) 
(paper on file with author). 
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accounting practice.  Since 1973, the SEC has designated FASB, a private organization, 
the standard-setter of accounting principles.  FASB establishes U.S. accounting standards 
by publishing several types of documents. The most important publication is the 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard.  The Statement of Financial Standard sets 
forth new accounting standards, the effective date and method of transition, background 
information, a brief summary of research done on the project, and the basis for the 
Board’s conclusions.  To further clarify the application of its Statements, FASB issues 
Interpretations.  Interpretations modify or extend existing standards.  Additionally, when 
businesses apply FASB Standards and Interpretations, they sometimes encounter 
difficulties or uncertainties, and they may ask FASB staff to provide further clarification.  
When fielding these questions, FASB staff may decide that some have widespread 
relevance and may wish to disseminate guidance more broadly.  In this case, the staff 
may issue a Staff Position.  Staff Positions are also used to make narrow and limited 
revisions to Statements or Interpretations.  Finally, FASB publishes Statements of 
Concepts.  Statements of Concepts do not announce new accounting standards; instead, 
they provide a general framework and agenda that FASB will follow to formulate new 
standards in the future.  Together, these various FASB pronouncements, along with non-
superseded statements by FASB’s predecessors and certain SEC’s accounting rules, form 
U.S. GAAP.12 
Until 2002, Congress placed few restrictions on the SEC’s authority to delegate 
the power to establish accounting rules to a private entity.  Then in 2002, Congress 
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which includes a provision stating that before the SEC 
 
12 See http://www.fasb.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2006); DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT,
ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 132-144 (2001). 
15
may recognize a private entity as the standard setter of accounting principles, the SEC 
must verify that the private entity meets several requirements.    The entity must (1) have 
a board of trustees, the majority of whom are not associated with any public accounting 
firm, (2) be funded as provided in section 109 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, (3) 
have procedures to ensure prompt consideration of changes to accounting principles 
necessary to reflect emerging accounting issues and changing business practices, and (4) 
consider the extent to which international convergence on high quality accounting 
standards is necessary or appropriate in the public interest.13 
2. IAS in the E.U. 
 
In Europe, until recently, there did not exist a set of continent-wide accounting 
rules; accounting was the domain of national governments.  Then in 2002, the European 
Council and Parliament adopted IASB as the E.U. counterpart to FASB by passing the 
IAS Regulation, which required E.U. companies listed in the European Union to use IAS 
starting in January 1, 2005.14 IASB, like FASB, is a private organization, but one 
difference is that IASB purports to be an international organization, which aims to set 
accounting standards for the world’s capital markets.15 
While the E.U. recognizes IASB as the standard-setter, the E.U. does not 
automatically defer to the IASB on accounting issues.  When the IASB promulgates a 
new accounting standard, this standard undergoes an endorsement process in which the 
European Commission reviews whether the standard meets several requirements.  The 
 
13 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 108(a), 116 Stat. 745, 768 (2002).  For additional 
discussion, see also Andreas M. Fleckner, FASB and IASB: Organization and Influence 15 (2005) (on file 
with author). 
14 Regulation (EC) no. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2002). 
15 See INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE FOUNDATION CONSTITUTION (July 2005), 
Part A Sec. 2(a).  See also Fleckner, supra note 13, at 6 (2005). 
16
proposed standard must (1) not be inconsistent with the requirement that annual accounts 
shall give a true and fair view of the company's assets, liabilities, financial position and 
profit or loss, (2) be conducive to the European public good, and (3) meet the criteria of 
understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability required of the financial 
information needed for making economic decisions and assessing the stewardship of 
management.16 Only once the Commission is satisfied that an IASB standard meets these 
requirements may it adopt the standard by passing a new regulation.   
This endorsement process is not mere formality.  One particularly controversial 
IASB accounting standard was IAS 39, which dealt with the accounting of derivatives.  
In its initial proposal, IASB permitted entities to record derivatives at fair market value, 
as opposed to historical cost.  The European Commission disagreed, arguing first that fair 
market value is not always easily verifiable, and second that the proposed standard would 
lead to increased earnings volatility.  After extended discussions with European 
regulators, IASB made some concessions, and the final IASB version of the standard 
imposed various limits on the use of the fair value option.  Nevertheless, the Commission 
remained less than fully satisfied and carved out portions of the IASB standard before 
adopting an incomplete version of IAS 39 in 2004.  In 2005, IASB continued to work 
with the Commission, and the two parties were able to resolve some disagreements.  This 
led the Commission to amend its IAS 39 regulation in November 2005; nevertheless, 
differences remain between the E.U. version of IAS 39 and the IASB’s version of IAS 
39.17 
16 Art 3(2), Regulation (EC) no. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2002). 
17 For a more detailed discussion, see HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY,
AND REGULATION 69-70 (Foundation Press, 13th ed., forthcoming 2006) (on file with author). 
17
In summary, the U.S. and the E.U are separated not only by the Atlantic, but also 
by differences in accounting.  Many are working to bridge these differences.  In 2002, 
FASB and IASB announced the Norwalk Agreement, which aimed to converge IAS and 
U.S. GAAP.18 The Norwalk Agreement was not an official agreement between the U.S. 
government and the E.U. government, but a private agreement between two 
nongovernmental entities.  Nevertheless, it was an important development and was 
praised by U.S. and E.U. regulators.19 Currently, while the Norwalk project remains 
ongoing, significant differences remain between the two accounting systems, and there is 
no indication that the Norwalk Agreement will yield full convergence, at least not within 
the short-term.  Meanwhile, the SEC and the European Commission have undertaken 
their own efforts at addressing the trans-Atlantic accounting problem.  We now address 
these efforts. 
3. U.S. GAAP in the E.U. 
 
Previously, accounting in Europe was only regulated at the nation-state level.  
Generally, member states permitted U.S. companies listed in Europe to publish their 
accounts in U.S. GAAP.  Recently, however, the E.U. passed two Directives – the 
Prospectus Directive and the Transparency Directive – that will soon require foreign 
companies listed in Europe to state their financial statements in IAS starting January 1, 
2007.  Under the Prospectus Directive, non-E.U. issuers conducting a public offering 
within the E.U. will need to publish a prospectus, which must include financial 
 
18 Memorandum of Understanding between FASB and IASB, “The Norwalk Agreement”, dated September 
18, 2002, available at http://www.fasb.org/intl/convergence_iasb.shtml (last visited Dec. 12, 2005). 
19 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Actions by IASB, FASB praised (Oct. 29, 2002), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-154.htm (September 8, 2005). Press Release, European 
Commission, Financial Reporting: European Commission welcomes IASB/FASB convergence agreement 
(Oct. 29, 2002). 
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statements prepared in accordance with IAS.20 Under the Transparency Directive, non-
E.U. issuers whose securities are traded on an E.U. market will have to provide annual 
and half-yearly financial statements prepared in accordance with IAS.21 
However, there is an important exception.  Recognizing that the IAS requirement 
imposes a significant obstacle for companies, the E.U. has indicated that it may 
accommodate certain foreign companies using the equivalence approach.  Specifically, 
non-E.U. companies will be able to use non-IAS accounting standards if the European 
Commission determines that such standards are equivalent to IAS.22 
For assistance in making the equivalence determination, the Commission turned 
to the Committee of the European Securities Regulators (CESR), an advisory committee 
of European regulators, and asked the committee for an assessment of whether certain 
non-IAS accounting standards, including U.S. GAAP, are equivalent to IAS.  CESR 
responded, first, by publishing a Concept Paper discussing what “equivalence” means in 
the accounting context and the methods and criteria CESR will use for making its 
equivalence determinations.23 CESR explained that "equivalent" should not mean 
“identical”; instead, CESR will focus on whether non-IAS standards provide sufficient 
information to enable investors to make similar decisions in terms of whether to invest or 
divest, as if they were provided with IAS financial statements.  CESR also explained that 
for each non-IAS accounting standard, it will make three assessments.  First, CESR will 
evaluate the non-IAS standard against four characteristics – relevance, understandability, 
 
20 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, November 4, 2003.  
21 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, December 15, 2004. 
22 Article 20, Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, November 4, 2003; 
Article 23, Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, December 15, 2004. 
23 CESR, “Concept Paper on Equivalence of Certain Third Country GAAP and on Description of Certain 
Third Countries Mechanisms of Enforcement of Financial Information,” Ref:CESR/04-509C (February 
2005).   Available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/data/document/04_509c.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2006). 
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reliability and comparability; investors should be able to take economic decisions on the 
basis of understandable, relevant, reliable and comparable information about the issuer's 
assets and liabilities, financial position and profit or loss.  Second, CESR will conduct a 
technical assessment, meaning that it will examine the accounting principles, concepts, 
and rules of the non-IAS accounting standard to determine whether any differences with 
IAS are significant.  Third, if IAS finds that there is non-equivalence due to significant 
differences between the two accounting standards, it will consider what remedy would be 
appropriate, and whether issuers should be required to restate their financial statements, 
or whether there may be more limited remedies. 
 Applying this methodology, CESR studied the accounting standards used in three 
countries: the U.S., Canada and Japan.  The group published its findings in June 2005.24 
CESR concluded that these three GAAPs, each taken as a whole, are equivalent to IAS, 
subject to some conditions.  With respect to U.S. GAAP, the conditions were (1) that 
certain companies that have subsidiaries which are not consolidated for U.S. GAAP 
purposes, but are required to be consolidated under IAS, must include unconsolidated 
entities on their U.S. GAAP pro-form balance sheets and income statements, (2) that the 
U.S. adopt accounting policies for the expensing of stock options on a basis equivalent to 
IAS, and (3) that with respect to certain IAS standards that are significantly different 
from U.S. GAAP, U.S. companies make additional disclosures.25 The option expensing 
 
24 CESR, “Technical Advice on Equivalence of Certain Third Country GAAP and on Description of 
Certain Third Countries Mechanims of Enforcement of Financial Information,” Ref:CESR/05-230b (June 
2005).  Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/securities/docs/prospectus/cesr-05-
230b_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2006). 
25 Id.
20
condition has since been satisfied26, and with regard to the other two conditions, 
responsibility to comply rests with individual issuers. 
The European Commission is currently considering the CESR’s 
recommendations and must soon make a decision about U.S. GAAP (as well as Canadian 
GAAP and Japanese GAAP).  There are several possible outcomes.  The Commission 
may agree with CESR that U.S. GAAP is equivalent.  Alternatively, the Commission 
may reject CESR’s findings and require U.S. companies to prepare IAS statements 
beginning January 2007.27 A third possibility is to postpone the equivalence decision for 
two years, and in the meantime, allow U.S. companies to continue to use U.S.GAAP.  
This last proposal was suggested by Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for the 
Internal Market and Services,28 and later, we will examine why Commissioner McCreevy 
favors this option.   
4. IAS in the U.S. 
 
Currently, the U.S. does not recognize the IAS, or any other accounting standard, 
as an acceptable alternative to U.S. GAAP.  The SEC requires that foreign issuers in the 
U.S. either prepare a set of financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP, or 
reconcile foreign statements, such as IAS statements, to U.S. GAAP.29 Reconciliation is 
a difficult and costly process in which the foreign issuer must explain material variations 
 
26 The U.S. adopted option expensing under FASB Accounting Standard No. 123, Share-Based Payment, 
which in most cases became applicable in 2006.  
27 For a summary of the adoption of IAS in Europe, see Alexander Schaub, The Use of International 
Accounting Standards in the European Union, 25 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 609 (2005). 
28 Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, EC Strategy on Financial 
Reporting: Progress on Convergence and Consistency, Speech at European Federation of Accountants' 
(FEE) Seminar on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (December 1, 2005), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/750&format=HTML&aged=0&l
anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Mar. 02, 2006). 
29 See Items 17(c) and 18(c) of Form 20-F, and Rule 4-01(a)(2) of Regulation S-X, 17 CFR 210.4-01(a)(2).  
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between the foreign accounting method and U.S. GAAP.   The requirement is a 
significant obstacle for foreign companies seeking to be listed on a U.S. exchange.30 
Since the 1990s, the SEC has permitted some exceptions to this reconciliation 
requirement.  Foreign issuers are allowed to use certain IAS standards without 
reconciling to U.S. GAAP, including use of IAS 7 to prepare a statement of cash flows, 
use of IAS 21 governing the effects of hyperinflation, and use of certain of portions of 
IAS 22 regarding the method of accounting for a business combination.31 “[T]he 
objective of this approach,” the SEC explains, “is to protect the interests of U.S. investors 
by requiring that all companies accessing U.S. public markets provide high quality 
financial reporting that satisfies the informational needs of investors, without requiring 
use of U.S. standards in the presentation of that information.”32 Essentially, the SEC has 
decided that IAS 7, IAS 21, and IAS 22 provide the same information as their U.S. 
counterparts. 
 More recently, the SEC has signaled that it may be willing to consider wider 
acceptance of IAS.  In a Concept Release issued in February 2000, the SEC invited 
comments on whether it should accept financial statements of foreign issuers prepared 
using IAS.  The Commission explained that it was considering several alternatives: (1) 
maintaining the current reconciliation requirements in all respects;  (2) removing some of 
the current reconciliation requirements for selected IAS standards and extending that 
recognition to additional IAS standards as warranted based on future review; (3) relying 
 
30 See, e.g., Rachel Carnachan, A Third Way: The Case for Competition between U.S. GAAP and IFRS in 
U.S. Capital Markets, 9 (2003) (paper on file with author); Richard A. Grasso, Chairman and CEO of the 
NYSE, Equity Market Globalization: A View from 11 Wall Street, Speech at Fordham University (January 
13, 1997); F. R. Jenkins, Listing of Foreign Securities on US Exchanges, JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE 
FINANCE 28-36 (Winter 1993). 
31 See Items 17 and 18 of Form 20-F., 17 CFR 249.220f. 
32 SEC Concept Release on International Accounting Standards, Release Nos. 33-7801, 34-42430 
(February 16, 2000). 
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on IAS standards for recognition and measurement principles, but requiring U.S. GAAP 
and SEC supplemental disclosure requirements for footnote disclosures and the level of 
detail for line items in financial statements; (4) accepting financial statements prepared in 
accordance with the IASC standards without any requirement to reconcile to U.S. 
GAAP.33 
Further progress was made in April 2005, when SEC announced a “roadmap” for 
moving toward the fourth alternative – accepting IAS statements without the 
reconciliation requirement.34 In this roadmap, SEC Chief Accountant Donald T. 
Nicolaisen acknowledged the world needed a high quality accounting standard that can 
be applied in a consistent manner, and he hoped that IAS will gain global acceptance.  
Nicolaisen also expressed that he would like to see further convergence between U.S. 
GAAP and IAS, such that the standards be reasonably comparable to each other, and such 
that investors are capable of and comfortable in understanding the nature of differences 
between the two sets of standards.  Nicolaisen envisioned a future in which U.S. GAAP 
and IAS coexist and enjoy widespread acceptance.  The roadmap also indicated that over 
the next few years, the SEC intended to (1) identify any changes to SEC rules that will be 
necessary upon elimination of the reconciliation requirement, (2) review the faithfulness 
and consistency of IAS statements filed by foreign private issuers, and (3) review the 
status of IAS-U.S. GAAP convergence.  Around 2009, the SEC will decide whether to 
eliminate the reconciliation requirement. 
 
33 SEC Concept Release on International Accounting Standards, Release Nos. 33-7801, 34-42430 
(February 16, 2000). 
34 Donald T. Nicolaisen, A Securities Regulator Looks at Convergence, (Address at the Symposium on the 
Convergence of Accounting Standards) 25 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 661, 672 (2005). 
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When the SEC eventually confronts the issue of whether to eliminate the 
reconciliation requirement, the SEC will essentially be making an equivalence 
determination, even though the SEC refrains from using the term “equivalence.”  If the 
SEC decides that it will accept IAS statements without reconciliation, then it means that 
the SEC believes that IAS serves an adequate substitute for U.S. GAAP.  The 2005 
roadmap seems to indicate, however, that before the SEC is willing to accept IAS as 
equivalent to U.S. GAAP, there must be substantial convergence between the two 
accounting standards.  As to how much convergence is necessary, SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox recently indicated in a Feb. 2006 press release that “while he would not 
insist on a particular degree of convergence as a prerequisite for elimination of the 
reconciliation, he would expect to see an effective process for converging IFRS and US 
GAAP, demonstrated by measurable progress in addressing priority issues.”35 
B. The E.U. Financial Conglomerates Directive 
 Another use of “equivalence” occurs in the E.U. Financial Conglomerates 
Directive.  The Financial Conglomerates Directive was adopted in December 2002 and 
went into effect in January 2005.36 Prior to the Directive, the E.U. regulated financial 
institutions on a stand-alone basis.  This meant that different types of financial 
institutions – banks, insurance companies, investment companies, and securities firms – 
were supervised separately by different government regulators, such as central banks, 
securities commissions, and ministries of finance.  However, with the emergence of 
financial conglomerates – financial groups that provide services and products in different 
 
35 Accounting Standards: SEC Chairman Cox and EU Commissioner McCreevy Affirm Commitment to 
Elimination of the Need for Reconciliation Requirements, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-17.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2006). 
36 Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, December 16, 2002. 
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sectors of the financial markets – the E.U. came to feel that stand-alone supervision was 
inadequate.  For example, one concern was that stand-alone supervision permitted 
conglomerates to cheat capital adequacy requirements.  In general, regulators require that 
financial institutions maintain at least some threshold level of capital to ensure their 
continued viability; in the case of conglomerates, regulators were worried that 
conglomerates could move capital between its subsidiaries, using the same capital as 
buffer against risks in two or more subsidiary entities, a practice know as “double 
gearing.”37 Responding to such concerns, the Financial Conglomerates Directive 
provides prudential supervision on a group-wide basis, also known as supplementary 
supervision.  In particular, the Directive instructs European regulators to regulate 
financial institutions at the conglomerate level, by monitoring their solvency position and 
risk concentration, their intra-group transactions, their internal risk management 
processes, and the fit and proper character of the management.38 As of November 2005, 
European regulators had identified sixty-three groups in Europe as financial 
conglomerates subject to supplementary supervision pursuant to the Directive.39 
To achieve group-wide supervision, the Directive appoints for each conglomerate 
a regulator who serves as the coordinator.40 This regulator coordinates the supervisory 
efforts of the all other government regulators, each of whom oversees individual entities 
within the conglomerate.  Prior to the Directive, the patchwork system of stand-alone 
 
37 MARKT/3021/2000, Towards an E.U. Directive on the Prudential Supervision of  Financial 
Conglomerates, Consultation Document, 19.12.2000, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/financial-conglomerates/supervision_en.htm#legislation (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2006). 
38 Id. 
39 Clive Briault, Managing Director, Retail Markets, Speech at FSA Joint Level 3 Committees Conference, 
Brussels, (November 24, 2005), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2005/1124_cb.shtml (Feb. 18, 2006). 
40 Art. 10(1), Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, December 16, 2002. 
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supervision resulted in undesirable “underlaps” – important conglomerate-level issues 
were unregulated – as well as undesirable “overlaps” – some financial entities were 
covered by different sets of regulations.  After the Directive, the hope was that the 
conglomerate coordinators would close loopholes in the regulatory scheme, reduce 
duplicate supervision, which were burdensome and costly for supervisors and the 
supervised entities, and simplify procedures and supervisory efforts.41 The coordinators' 
specific responsibilities include gathering and disseminating information about the 
conglomerate, supervising and assessing the financial situation of the conglomerate, 
assessing whether the conglomerate is complying with rules on capital adequacy, risk 
concentration, and intra-group transactions, and planning supervisory activities.42 
Article 10 of the Directive governs the appointment of coordinators.  Where a 
regulated entity heads a financial conglomerate, Article 10 appoints as the coordinator the 
government regulator that oversees the parent entity.  Where a non-regulated entity heads 
a conglomerate, Article 10 selects from among the regulators of subsidiary entities by 
considering factors such as the locations of the head offices, and the relative importance 
and size of the various entities within the conglomerate. 
 The impact of the Directive is not restricted to European companies.  Pursuant to 
the Directive, a non-European parent company that does not itself do business in the E.U. 
may nonetheless be subject to European regulation if it owns a subsidiary financial 
institution that operates in Europe.43 Whether or not European supervision is warranted 
 
41 MARKT/3021/2000, Towards an E.U. Directive on the Prudential Supervision of  Financial 
Conglomerates, Consultation Document, 19.12.2000, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/financial-conglomerates/supervision_en.htm#legislation (Feb. 
14, 2006). 
42 Art. 11, Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, December 16, 2002. 
43 Art. 5(3), Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, December 16, 2002. 
26
turns on an equivalence determination, a determination that is made by the coordinator of 
the conglomerate44. If the coordinator determines that the parent is subject to third-
country supervision that is equivalent to European supervision, then the coordinator does 
not have to exercise supplementary supervision.  If the coordinator determines that third-
country supervision is not equivalent, it may exercise supplementary supervision over the 
parent.  Alternatively, the coordinator may require that the conglomerate establish a 
European holding company, which would be the parent company for the European 
subsidiaries of the conglomerate.   This holding company would be subject to 
supplementary supervision.  The Directive also permits coordinators to consider other 
solutions as they see proper.45 As of November 2005, there were fifteen non-European 
conglomerates with a European presence (importantly, in this context Switzerland counts 
as a non-European country because it lies outside the European Economic Area).46 
To decide whether third-country supervision is equivalent, E.U. regulators must 
consider two issues.  The first is whether the third-country’s substantive rules, as 
enforced, are consistent with the Directive.  Recital 13 of the Directive requires that 
European entities with foreign parents should be “subject to equivalent and appropriate 
supplementary supervisory arrangements which achieve objectives and results similar to 
those pursued by the provisions of this Directive.”  However, having comparable 
substantive regulations is not enough.  Recital 14 additionally requires the full 
participation and assistance of the third-country regulator – “equivalent and appropriate 
 
44 Item 46, 14.11.2005 Issues arising from the transposition, interpretation and implementation of the 
Directive , available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/financial-
conglomerates/supervision_en.htm#legislation (last visited Apr. 30, 2006). 
45 Art. 18, , Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, December 16, 2002. 
46 Clive Briault, Managing Director, Retail Markets, Speech at FSA Joint Level 3 Committees Conference, 
Brussels (November 24, 2005), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2005/1124_cb.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 
2006). 
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supplementary supervisory arrangements can only be assumed to exist if the third-
country supervisory authorities have agreed to cooperate with the competent authorities 
concerned on the means and objectives of exercising supplementary supervision of the 
regulated entities of a financial conglomerate.”47 
In the U.S., the Directive had very little impact in the banking industry, but had 
significant impact on the securities industry.48 With respect to U.S. banks, the Federal 
Reserve had long been supervising banking institutions at the holding company level.  
The Federal Reserve believed that its practices were fully consistent with the 
requirements of the Financial Conglomerates Directive, and it was confident that its 
regulatory scheme would be found to be equivalent to the European framework.49 
In the securities industry, at the time, the SEC only regulated companies at the 
broker-dealer level, and not at the holding company level.  Consequently, U.S. securities 
firms expressed concern that E.U. regulators would find U.S. securities regulation not to 
be equivalent to European regulation, and that as a result, they would be adversely 
impacted by the Directive.  In particular, U.S. companies worried that they would face 
increased cost of doing business in Europe, that they could be subject to higher capital 
 
47 Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, December 16, 2002.  See also 
06.07.2004 - Third country supervision and equivalence: European Financial Conglomerates Committee 
issues general guidance to EU supervisors on supervision in the United States of America,  available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/financial-conglomerates/supervision_en.htm#legislation (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2006). 
48 Ivo Keltner, Financial Conglomerates Directive And Its Impact on US Firms, Harvard Law School LLM 
Thesis 23 (2003). 
49 Mark W. Olson, The European Union's Financial Services Action Plan, Testimony before the Committee 
on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (May 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2002/20020522/default.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 
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and risk control requirements than an EU-based firm and be placed at a competitive 
disadvantage, and that they might be required to create a holding company in the EU.50 
Congress and the SEC responded to these concerns.  In 1999, Congress passed 
legislation authorizing the SEC to supervise the holding company of a SEC-registered 
broker-dealer 51, and in 2004, the SEC promulgated rules permitting holding companies 
to voluntarily apply for SEC supervision on a group-wide basis.  Such a holding company 
would become a “supervised investment bank holding company” (SIBHC)52. In its 
release, the SEC expressed that it expected its new rules would meet the equivalence 
standard of the EU Directive.  The release also contemplated significant cost savings for 
U.S. companies.  The SEC calculated that in the absence of an equivalence determination, 
if an E.U. regulator were to require a U.S. company to create a European holding 
company, it would cost the U.S. company approximately $8 million plus additional 
potential costs.  These expenditures would not be necessarily, if E.U. regulators 
recognized the SEC as an equivalent supervisor.   
The new SEC rules impose similar obligations on holding companies as the 
European Financial Conglomerates Directive.  To qualify for SIBHC status, a U.S. 
holding company must have a subsidiary broker-dealer with a substantial presence in the 
securities markets, which may be demonstrated by a showing that the broker-dealer 
maintains tentative net capital of $100 million or more.  Upon becoming a SIBHC, the 
holding company must meet certain requirements regarding its group-wide internal risk 
 
50 Annette L. Nazareth, Director, Division of Market Regulation at the SEC, Concerning Certain Pending 
Proposals by the European Commission, Testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. 
House of Representatives (May 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/052202tsaln.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). 
51 Pub.L. 106-102, Title II, § 231(a), 113 Stat. 1402 (1999). 
52 SEC Release No. 34-49831 (Jun. 8, 2004). 
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management control system, recordkeeping, and periodic reporting.  Additionally, a 
SIBHC must calculate net capital on a consolidated basis according to rules designed to 
be consistent with Basel standards.  The SEC believed that three U.S. companies would 
seek SIBHC status pursuant to the new rules.53 
Presently, European coordinators must determine whether U.S. supervision is 
equivalent to E.U. supervision.  In June 2004, the European Financial Conglomerates 
Committee and the European Banking Advisory Committee jointly published a report 
issuing general guidance to EU supervisors.54 After reviewing the U.S. regulatory system, 
the report found that there was broad equivalence across the various financial industries – 
banking, securities and insurance markets.  However, the report contained certain caveats.  
The report noted that some U.S. regulators, including the SEC, were undertaking 
consolidated supervision for the first time (the report conceded that this was also true for 
European regulators), and that while on paper, U.S. regulations should be capable of 
achieving the objectives of the Directive, the report advised that final judgment should 
depend on how well the regulations work in practice.  In particular, the report cautioned 
E.U. regulators that the new SEC rules were peculiar in that they created a voluntary 
regime, i.e., groups can opt into and withdraw from the regime; nevertheless, the report 
also expressed the opinion that this alone should not prevent the regimes from being 
effective.  Finally, the report warned that the SEC rules were more lenient than European 
rules in one respect – that SEC rules permit holding companies to include unsubordinated 
 
53 Id.  
54 06.07.2004 -Third country supervision and equivalence: European Financial Conglomerates Committee 
Issues General Guidance to EU Supervisors on Supervision in the United States of America, available at 
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long-term debt in capital for a transitional period.  EU supervisors should consider 
whether this poses a problem.  
Notwithstanding the June 2004 general guidance report, E.U. coordinators must 
ultimately decide for themselves whether U.S. supplementary supervision is adequate.  
For most U.S. companies operating in Europe, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 
the U.K. is the E.U. coordinator.  The FSA has indicated that in the case of non-
equivalence, it is likely to require the non-European conglomerate to establish a 
European holding company.  The FSA would monitor and restrict activities between the 
European sub-group and the worldwide group, a regulatory practice known as “ring-
fencing."55 
Curiously, the FSA decides whether foreign financial conglomerates are subject 
to equivalent home supervision on a firm-by-firm basis rather than a country-by-country 
basis.  Moreover, these decisions are not publicly available – they are communicated 
directly to firms through private letters.  The only publicly available information about 
the status of U.S. conglomerates comes from an October 2005 speech by a SEC regulator.  
The regulator revealed that, as of the date of the speech, the FSA had accepted the SEC's 
oversight of U.S. investment bank Merrill Lynch as equivalent to the supervision 
described in the Directive.  Also, the regulator expected the FSA to make equivalence 
findings with regard to other US broker-dealer groups within the following month.56 
Presumably, this is done, but the FSA has not made any public announcements.  Later, 
 
55 Newsletter 204, Financial Services Authority, Financial Groups (October 2003), p.3, available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp204_newsletter.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2006). 
56 Cynthia A. Glassman , SEC Commissioner, Remarks before the Center for the Study of International 
Business Law Breakfast Roundtable Series (October 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch100705cag.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2006). 
31
the paper will discuss the non-transparent manner in which the FSA makes its 
equivalence determinations. 
C. U.S. Regulation of Auditors 
A series of corporate scandals, beginning with the collapse of Enron in late 2001, 
prompted many to question the integrity of the accounting profession.  To address these 
concerns, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.   Among the changes it 
brought, Sarbanes-Oxley created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), a private-sector, nonprofit organization charged by federal law to oversee the 
accounting profession.  Such a regulatory body had never existed before.  The PCAOB’s 
statutory responsibilities include (1) registration of accounting firms that audit public 
companies trading in U.S. securities markets, (2) inspection of registered accounting 
firms, (3) establishment of standards for auditing, quality control, ethics, and 
independence, as well as attestation, for registered accounting firms, and (4) investigation 
and discipline of registered accounting firms and associated persons for violations of law 
or professional standards.  The PCAOB is supervised by the SEC, who must approve the 
PCAOB’s budget and rules and may remove members of the PCAOB Board for cause.57 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, accounting firms must register with the PCAOB if they 
prepare or issue audit reports on financial statements filed in the U.S.  This affects 
foreign accounting firms as well as domestic accounting firms.  Many U.S. public 
companies have significant operations in other countries and hire foreign auditors to audit 
their foreign operations.  These foreign auditors must register with the PCAOB.  
 
57 PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD ANN. REP. (2003), available at 
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Separately, about 1,200 public companies based outside of the United States trade in U.S. 
securities markets.  These companies also have reporting requirements in the U.S., and 
their foreign auditors must also register with the PCAOB.  As of November 21, 2005, 640 
non-U.S. accounting firms based in 81 countries were registered with the PCAOB.58 
Theoretically, the PCAOB could assert authority to inspect any and all of these foreign 
firms.59 
Foreign regulators expressed concern over this perceived attempt by the U.S. to 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Commenting on PCAOB proposed rules relating to 
the oversight of non-U.S. accounting firms, the Director General for the Internal Market 
at the European Commission stressed the need for “a true EU-US cooperative approach 
on auditor oversight based on effective equivalence of regulation and oversight.”  He 
pointed out that direct inspections of European companies by PCAOB officials may 
cause legal or even constitutional difficulties in some European countries, and the 
Director General favored limiting the participation of PCAOB personnel to cases where 
knowledge of U.S. standards cannot be secured by other means.60 Similarly, Director for 
International Financial Markets of the Financial Services Agency of Japan beseeched the 
PCAOB to heed the principles of mutual respect for each jurisdiction's sovereignty, and 
the Director also warned that the Japanese Government would not give consent to the 
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exercise of public authority by the PCAOB, including inspection and investigation, on 
Japanese territory.61 
Eventually, the PCAOB conceded to some extent to the views of foreign 
regulators and to the practical difficulties of sending inspectors to foreign countries.  In 
June 2004, the Board issued rules providing that a foreign, registered public accounting 
firm may request the Board to rely on inspections conducted by a foreign, home-country 
supervisor instead of administering its own investigations.62 In response to such a request, 
the Board will decide how much reliance to place on the home supervisor by examining 
the quality of the foreign supervisory system.  The more independent and rigorous the 
foreign system, the more the Board will rely on the home supervisor and the less directly 
involved the Board needs to be.  Reliance may also depend on the home supervisor’s 
willingness to update the Board on a regular basis and its willingness to share relevant 
findings with the Board.  While the PCAOB rules do not make explicit reference to the 
term “equivalence,” the decision whether to rely on a foreign supervisor amounts to an 
equivalence determination, in which the PCAOB decides whether the foreign supervisory 
system is as independent and rigorous as the U.S. regime.   
A number of countries have instituted or revised their own auditor oversight 
systems with the hope and expectation that the PCAOB will find home country 
supervision to be adequate.   In April 2004, Japan established the Certified Public 
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Accountants and Auditing Oversight Board, a Japanese counterpart to the PCAOB.63 
And in the E.U., while there is already auditor oversight at the level of individual member 
states, the E.U. is considering a new Directive that seeks to ensure more robust public 
oversight over European auditors and would require the registration of audit firms.64 The 
PCAOB has praised these efforts65, and is currently in the midst of negotiating with 
foreign regulators over how to conduct inspections.  These negotiations are still 
preliminary and are subject to change – the PCAOB is only just beginning to inspect 
foreign accounting firms.  But already, some observers worry about the lack of 
transparency.  The Board has not publicly announced a list of countries for which it is 
willing to rely on foreign inspections.  Critics fear that the PCAOB is trying to shield 
itself from public scrutiny, hiding the fact that it is making determinations on an ad hoc,
unprincipled basis. 
D. U.S.-Canada Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System 
 
In place since 1991, the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS) is a joint 
initiative by the SEC and the Canadian Securities Administrators designed to facilitate 
U.S. and Canadian companies in cross-border transactions by subjecting them only to 
home country regulation.66 Prior to the MJDS, companies had to prepare two sets of 
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disclosure documents, one according to U.S. securities laws and the other according to 
Canadian laws.  The MJDS allows companies to use disclosure documents filed in their 
home jurisdiction in the host jurisdiction.  Additionally, the host country will defer to the 
home country’s review process.  Home country regulators have primary responsibility for 
reviewing disclosure documents, and host country regulators generally forgo review.67 
The MJDS covers cross-border offerings, issuer bids, take-over bids, business 
combinations and continuous disclosure and other filings.   
 One might plausibly view the MJDS as a regime that draws upon the principle of 
equivalence.  Essentially, each country agrees that despite some differences, the other 
country’s securities regulation regime is “close enough.”  Hence, when a Canadian 
company issues securities under MJDS, the company need only comply with Canadian 
disclosure requirements and need not worry about U.S. requirements.  The SEC explains:  
 By adopting the MJDS, the Commission in essence is adopting as 
its own requirements the disclosure requirements of Canadian forms.  The 
effect is the same as if the Commission had set forth each Canadian 
requirement within the MJDS forms ….  Accordingly, good faith 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the home jurisdiction will 
constitute compliance with the applicable U.S. federal securities disclosure 
requirements, even if such compliance results in the omission of 
information which might otherwise have been required as a line item in 
registration statements filed by U.S. issuers on the Commission's other 
registration forms. [emphasis added]68 
The SEC acknowledges persistent differences between U.S. and Canadian disclosure 
requirements, but nevertheless judges the two to be functionally substitutable. 
Concededly, while the MJDS bears some characteristics similar to equivalence, to 
call the MJDS “an example of equivalence” would strain what we mean by the term 
 
67 See HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION, 79-84 
((Foundation Press, 13th ed., Forthcoming 2006) (on file with author); 71-101CP The Multijurisdictional 
Disclosure System, available at http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/policy.asp?id=1299 (last visited Apr. 13, 2006). 
68 56 Fed. Reg. 30036 fn. 130 (1991). 
36
“equivalence.”  The MJDS example differs from the previous three examples in a couple 
ways.  First, the U.S., rather than accepting Canadian securities law in a wholesale 
manner, instead imposes certain additional requirements on Canadian companies.  Most 
significantly, while Canadian regulators require companies to use Canadian GAAP, the 
SEC determined in 1993 that there were “significant differences in accounting principles 
and practices … between Canadian GAAP and U.S. GAAP” and has since required 
Canadian companies to reconcile financial statements to U.S. GAAP.69 Additionally, 
MJDS issuers must supplement their registration with certain additional disclosures that 
are not required under Canadian law, such as disclosure of indemnification provisions 
regarding directors, officers, and controlling persons.  Moreover, U.S. fraud liability rules 
– and in particular, Rule 10b-5 – continue to apply.70 In light of these additional 
requirements, the MJDS might be more fairly viewed as a type of “equivalence-plus” 
regime.  
Second, the MJDS is a bilateral agreement.  The U.S. and Canada mutually agree 
to allow companies from the other country to be governed by home country regulation.  
The SEC rule adopting the MJDS expressly acknowledges this notion of reciprocity: 
Concurrently with the publication of this Release, the Canadian 
Securities Administrators are publishing a National Policy Statement that 
adopts a largely parallel multijurisdictional disclosure system in Canada. 
That system permits U.S. issuers to satisfy certain securities registration 
and reporting requirements in Canada using disclosure documents 
prepared in accordance with Commission requirements. That National 
Policy Statement is published as an appendix to this Release.71 
69 58 Fed. Reg. 35367 (1993). 
70 HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION, 81 (Foundation 
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Here, the SEC emphasizes that the Canadian Policy Statement and the 
SEC release were published concurrently, and that the two systems are largely 
parallel. Canadian issuers coming to the U.S. benefit from the agreement, just as 
U.S. issuers going to Canada benefit.  To further emphasize the point of 
reciprocity, the SEC even attaches the Canadian Statement as an appendix.  Some 
commentators have thus categorized the MJDS as an example of “mutual 
recognition” rather than equivalence.72 Mutual recognition is the policy under 
which a country offers favorable treatment to companies from a foreign country in 
return for favorable treatment of its own companies by the foreign country.  It 
rests on the principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity.  As we shall see, these 
principles are largely absent from conventional notions of equivalence, although 
the current trend is that equivalence is slowly incorporating these ideas and 
grappling towards something akin to mutual recognition. 
IV. Evaluating Equivalence 
A. Potential Benefits 
1. Reducing Transaction Costs 
 The primary justification for equivalence is that it reduces transaction costs.  
Absent equivalence, a company seeking to expand its operations into a foreign country 
must continue to comply with home country regulations, and additionally, undertake 
certain actions to comply with host country regulations.  This may require that the 
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company incur significant financial costs.  Furthermore, if home and host country 
regulations are comparable, to insist that the company comply with host country 
regulation will not significantly increase protection for investors.  The better approach is 
to subject the company only to the home country regulatory regime, thus making it less 
costly for the company to operate in the host country. 
Such is the argument for equivalence in the case of accounting standards.  Absent 
a finding of equivalence, U.S. companies conducting public offerings in Europe must 
prepare IAS financial statements in addition to U.S. GAAP financial statements.  
Similarly, a European company that is listed in the U.S. must prepare IAS statements for 
its home country regulators and U.S. GAAP statements (or statements reconciled to U.S. 
GAAP) for the SEC.  The resulting costs can be substantial, thus explaining why 
financial industries are pushing for equivalence.  In 2002, the Chief Financial Officer of 
Nokia estimated an annual savings of approximately $500,000 if the SEC would allow 
Nokia to maintain its NYSE listing on the basis of IAS disclosure statements alone.73 
More recently, in 2005, an E.U. regulator indicated that he believed that among the 
approximately 250 EU issuers listed in the U.S., the largest companies spend between 1 
and as much as 10 million dollars per year to reconcile IAS to U.S. GAAP.74 
Equivalence may also yield significant cost savings in the context of the Financial 
Conglomerates Directive.  As discussed earlier, pursuant the Directive, if a non-E.U. 
financial conglomerate is not subject to equivalent home supervision, an E.U. regulator 
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may require the conglomerate to establish a European holding company for supervisory 
purposes.  The SEC calculated that the cost for a U.S. company to establish a holding 
company in Europe would be approximately $8 million.75 The U.S. company can avoid 
this expenditure if E.U. regulators finds SEC supervision to be equivalent to E.U. 
supervision. 
 In addition to cost savings for firms, equivalence may also produce cost savings 
for regulators.  For example, the PCAOB’s 2006 budget provides $128.4 million, net of 
interest, in outlays for the calendar year.  The majority of the outlays are for salaries and 
other expenses related to the hiring of the experienced auditors needed to conduct 
inspections.  Firms with more than 100 public company clients must be inspected 
annually; firms with one to 100 public company clients must be inspected every three 
years.  Many of these inspections will occur abroad; as of Nov. 21, 2005, 640 out of 
1,586 public accounting firms registered with the Board (approximately forty percent) 
were based outside the United States.76 From this statistic, it seems clear that the 
PCAOB can significantly reduce its expenditures if the Board is willing to deem foreign 
oversight equivalent to domestic oversight and rely on inspections by foreign 
counterparts. 
 Equivalence skeptics would respond that there are other ways to reduce 
transactions costs.  In particular, those who favor harmonization over equivalence may 
argue that harmonization yields even lower transaction costs.  Why not pursue 
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harmonization instead of equivalence?  The follow subsections list some of the 
advantages of equivalence over harmonization. 
2. Feasibility 
 In many situations, full harmonization is not feasible, and equivalence is a 
second-best solution.  Harmonization may be difficult for a variety of reasons. 
 First, harmonization requires broad consensus across countries – countries must 
agree to single set of harmonized regulations.  However, it may be difficult to forge such 
consensus; invariably, countries will disagree on matters of policy.  This is especially 
problematic outside the European Union.  The E.U. at least provides a forum in which 
disagreements can be sorted out.  But even within Europe, harmonization has not been 
easy, and E.U. regulators have been forced to turn to equivalence.  During the 1970s, the 
E.U. made several attempts to harmonize regulations with the aim of creating a single, 
integrated internal market – for example, by abolishing custom duties and other trade 
restrictions between European states.  But these attempts were largely unsuccessful, and 
the E.U. was forced to retreat from full harmonization and focus instead on instituting 
some common minimum standards.  This was the approach in the E.U. Commission’s 
1985 White Paper77, which sought to reduce certain barriers to the movement of goods, 
services, and capital within Europe.  The White Paper acknowledged that “experience has 
shown that … a strategy based totally on harmonization would be over-regulatory, would 
take too long to implement, would be inflexible and could stifle innovation,” and “a clear 
distinction needs to be drawn in future internal market initiatives between what is 
essential to harmonize, and what may be left to mutual recognition of national regulations 
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and standards.”78 Under the White Paper approach, European states agree not to put up 
certain barriers to trade, but are free to enact other types of regulations.  European states 
also agree to recognize the regulations of other member states.  Some commentators have 
described this intra-E.U. regulatory regime as one based on “equivalence.”79 
Second, regulatory agencies can only act pursuant to legislative authorization – 
full harmonization may be outside their statutory authority.  Such is the situation in the 
case of accounting standards.  As discussed previously, the SEC currently requires 
foreign companies to reconcile foreign financial statements to U.S. GAAP, a very costly 
process.  If the SEC chooses an equivalence solution, the agency may do so simply by 
eliminating the reconciliation requirement.80 This is clearly within its statutory authority.  
In fact, the SEC has already waived reconciliation with respect to a few IAS standards.  
In contrast, if the SEC wishes to pursue full harmonization, the agency may face certain 
statutory restrictions.   For example, the SEC’s roadmap acknowledges as a future 
possibility the replacement of FASB with IASB as the official standard setter of U.S. 
accounting rules.81 This is one way to achieve full harmonization.  But even assuming 
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that the SEC wants to switch to IASB, Congress has limited the SEC’s authority to 
appoint a new standard setter.  In particular, Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the standard 
setter must meet several statutory requirements.  Currently, FASB is the only 
organization that meets the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley82, and the SEC has no choice 
but to recognize FASB as the official standard setter.  The alternative is to lobby 
Congress to amend Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Third, harmonization may be infeasible if it is perceived as violating national 
regulatory prerogatives; again, in this case, equivalence may serve as a second-best 
alternative.  This is potentially an issue in the case of IAS-U.S. GAAP convergence.  
There has been at least one incident in the recent past when nationalism stood in the way 
of accounting reform.  When deciding whether to adopt IAS 39, the European 
Commission received a letter from French President Jacques Chirac warning that the 
adoption of certain IAS standards would have “nefarious consequences for financial 
stability.”83 President Chirac’s letter was widely interpreted as continental Europe 
proclaiming independence from the U.K. and the U.S. in accounting matters, and the 
IASB Chairman observed that, “France … has a different culture of accounting….  It is a 
proud and independent country and they saw what to them was an alien culture being 
rammed down their throat.”84 One can imagine similar resistance to future attempts to 
converge IAS and U.S. GAAP.  If full convergence is infeasible, one view is that 
regulators should switch to equivalence as a substitute for convergence. 
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Similarly, in the case of auditor oversight, equivalence may be the only feasible 
option in light of sovereignty concerns.  When the PCAOB asserted jurisdiction over 
foreign auditors, it was accused of violating the national sovereignty of foreign nations.  
Foreign regulators protested fiercely to the PCAOB assertion that it had authority to 
inspect and investigate foreign audit firms.  One European regulator declared that direct 
inspections by PCAOB officials would cause legal and constitutional difficulties in 
European countries, and a Japanese regulator warned that the Japanese government 
would not allow the PCAOB to exercise public authority in Japan.85 If barred from 
entering these jurisdictions, the Board will have no choice but to rely on foreign 
regulators.  This would be de facto recognition that foreign inspections are equivalent to 
PCAOB inspections. 
3. Flexibility to Address Real Differences 
When there are real differences between countries, it may be unwise to force 
countries to adopt the same regulations.  Harmonization may be undesirable.  
Equivalence may be the preferred alternative, one which allows countries to pursue 
different rules to accommodate real differences. 
In the case of accounting, it may be preferable that Europe and the U.S. employ 
differing accounting standards to accommodate real differences.  In continental Europe, 
such as in France and Germany, accounting and taxation are closely integrated.  These 
countries sometimes use accounting rules as an instrument of tax policy, for example, by 
offering tax breaks for businesses by allowing generous measurements of expenses and 
modest measurements of revenues.  In contrast, the U.S. separates accounting and 
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taxation.  Tax breaks can be enjoyed independently of the way results are reported to 
shareholders.86 
There are other real differences.  The U.S. has stricter legal liability standards.  
Also, class action suits are available as a means of enforcement.  For these reasons, it 
makes sense for the U.S. to use a rule-based accounting regime rather than a principle-
based accounting regime.  The rule-based approach provides certainty to U.S. companies, 
who may follow the rules to avoid liability.  In Europe, there is not the same need for a 
rule-based approach.87 As an aside, the fact that accounting rules are enforced differently 
in the U.S. and Europe raises the issue of whether U.S. accounting standards and 
European accounting standards can ever be “truly” equivalent.  We will revisit this.  For 
now, the point is simply that there are reasons for having different accounting standards 
in Europe and the U.S. 
These real differences between Europe and the U.S. push in favor of equivalence 
over harmonization.  Equivalence allows regulators to pursue different rules to 
accommodate real differences. In its Concept paper, the CESR emphasized that 
“equivalent” accounting rules should not mean “identical” accounting rules; equivalence 
only means that the rules are sufficiently alike to enable investors to take similar 
investment decisions.  “For example,” the CESR explains, “some differences in 
accounting treatment may not be significant in terms of equivalence because they arise 
from differing legal elements, for instance accounting for tax purposes.“88 
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4. Competition of Rules 
There is a well-developed line of literature advocating regulatory competition.  
Not only does regulatory competition accommodate real differences, but more 
importantly, regulatory competition fosters innovation.  It allows regulators to experiment 
and to learn through trial and error.  In this manner, regulators can develop more efficient 
regulatory regimes.  
Equivalence, to a lesser degree, shares these same benefits.  In a speech quoted in 
part earlier, European regulator Alexander Schaub notes that equivalence incorporates 
some aspects of regulatory competition.  
 
Working on the basis of equivalence is not an admission of defeat: 
it is a healthy recognition by both sides that there can be more than one 
way to achieve a common objective. In many cases, there is no perfect 
solution to a regulatory problem. In some cases, the regulatory solution 
used in one jurisdiction might not work in the other. We need an organized 
and cooperative coexistence: a managed competition of equivalent 
systems based on common underpinnings.89 
Schaub asserts that equivalence, like regulatory competition, allows countries 
some flexibility to pursue similar objections through different means.  Furthermore, 
Schaub encourages “managed competition” of regulatory systems, implying that, over 
time, competition leads to improvement. 
 Admittedly, there is more opportunity for innovation under regulatory 
competition than under equivalence, because equivalence is more restrictive than 
regulatory competition.  Under equivalence, regulators are free to experiment to some 
extent, but they are not given carte blanche. Instead, regulators must stay within the 
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bounds of what is “functionally substitutable.”  This illustrates a basic tension of 
equivalence.  One the one hand, equivalence requires that two regulations are 
“sufficiently similar,” or “close enough.”  On the other hand, equivalence recognizes that 
it is often important for different countries regulate in different ways.  Another way of 
expressing the same point is that equivalence represents an uneasy compromise between 
harmonization and regulatory competition. 
B. Potential Pitfalls 
1. Insufficient Protection for Host Country Investors 
This section lists four warnings regarding equivalence.  All relate to investor 
protection.  First, home country substantive law may offer less investor protection than 
host country substantive law.  Second, home country laws may be under-enforced.  Third, 
home country regulators may be unwilling to cooperate with host country regulators.  
Fourth, if the law, as applied, is inconsistent across jurisdictions, this creates uncertainty 
among investors. 
Critics of equivalence worry that if regulators import foreign substantive laws that 
are less rigorous than domestic laws, this will harm domestic investors.  This may explain 
why some U.S. regulators have been reluctant to embrace the concept of equivalence; 
frankly, they fear that foreign regulation is too lax and thus not comparable to U.S. 
regulation.  This concern is most apparent in the accounting context, where despite 
pressure from Europe, the SEC remains cautious and hesitant toward accepting IAS as an 
alternative to U.S. GAAP.  In a recent speech before the Federation of European 
Accountants, the SEC Director of the Office of International Affairs drew attention to the 
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fact that “accounting standards in the United States have a long and unique history,” that 
“U.S. GAAP has been used extensively in the United States since the 1930s,” and that 
today U.S. GAAP “is widely-used, comprehensive, well-understood, and well-regarded 
both at home and internationally.”90 In contrast, “IFRS have only existed … just a few 
years,” and unlike U.S. GAAP, “it has little to no history of application and 
interpretation.”91 In other words, the Director is worried that IAS does not offer 
sufficient investor protection, at least in its current form.  The SEC will eliminate the 
reconciliation requirement only when it is satisfied that the quality of IAS is on par with 
U.S. GAAP. 
Even if two sets of regulations are substantively similar, there is still the problem 
of enforcement.  This is a concern anytime a host country regulator relies on the home 
country regulator to execute laws – for example, by reviewing disclosure documents or 
by conducting on-site inspections.   Even if on the books, home country regulation 
appears identical to host country regulation, there is still the danger that home country 
regulation might be under-enforced.  Research suggests that countries vary widely in 
their actual enforcement of financial regulations, and consequently similar, or even 
identical substantive regulations, may yield different results.92 
The enforcement problem is one that PCAOB struggles with on a recurring basis.  
When the Board decides whether to rely on foreign inspections, the most pressing issue is 
the effectiveness of the foreign enforcement: 
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Under the Board's rules, a firm would first provide the Board with 
a one-time statement asking the Board to rely on a non-U.S. inspection. At 
an appropriate time before each inspection of a non-U.S. firm that has 
submitted such a statement, the Board would determine the appropriate 
degree of reliance based on information about the non-U.S. system 
obtained primarily from the non-U.S. regulator regarding the 
independence and rigor of the non-U.S. system. The Board would also 
base its decision on its discussions with the appropriate entity or entities 
within the oversight system concerning the specific inspection work 
program for the non-U.S. firm's inspection at hand. The more independent 
and rigorous a home country system, the higher the Board's reliance on 
that system. A higher level of reliance translates into less direct 
involvement by the Board in the inspection of the non-U.S. registered 
public accounting firm. 
The Board's rule on investigations … provides that the Board may, 
in appropriate circumstances, rely upon the investigation or sanction, if 
any, of a foreign registered public accounting firm by a non-U.S. authority. 
The Board's reliance would depend, in part, on the independence and rigor 
of the non-U.S. authority.  Reliance also may depend on the non-U.S. 
authority's willingness to update the Board regarding the investigation on 
a regular basis and its willingness and authority to share the relevant 
evidence gathered with the Board.93 
The Board emphasizes that in order for foreign enforcement to be effective, the 
foreign regulatory authority must be “independent” and “rigorous.”  Before making its 
decision, the Board will inquire into the type and quality of inspections performed by the 
foreign authority.  If the foreign authority proves to be particularly dependable, the Board 
may even rely upon the foreign agency to investigate misconducts by foreign accounting 
firms and will honor any sanctions imposed by the foreign agency.  But strong 
enforcement, by itself, is not sufficient.  Importantly, even if the foreign authority is very 
capable of enforcing the laws, the PCAOB will hesitate to rely on the agency, unless the 
agency shows willingness to cooperate with the Board.  Hence, while cooperation and 
 
93 PCAOB Release No. 2004-005: Final Rules Relating to the Oversight of Non-U.S. Public Accounting 
Firms, June 9, 2004, available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket_013/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 
20, 2006). 
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enforcement are conceptually distinct, it seems that at least in this context they must go 
hand-in-hand. 
Similarly, the drafters of the E.U. Financial Conglomerate Directive also 
recognized the importance of enforcement and cooperation.  The Directive instructs that 
in order to determine whether third-country supervision is equivalent to European 
supervision, E.U. regulators must consider not just whether the third-country provides 
group-wide supervision on the books, but also whether in practice, the third-country 
“achieves objectives and results similar to those pursued by the provisions of this 
Directive.”94 But again, good enforcement by itself is not sufficient.  The provision that 
immediately follows instructs E.U. regulators to ask whether “the third-country 
supervisory authorities have agreed to cooperate with the competent [E.U.] authorities.”95 
As in the previous example, the Directive links enforcement with cooperation, on the 
theory that while the quality of third-country enforcement is important, also important is 
open communications between the third-country regulator and the E.U. regulator so that 
the E.U. regulator can confirm that there is adequate enforcement. 
The preceding examples illustrate the importance of enforcement, but one may 
ask whether sometimes, equivalence may be possible even without strong enforcement on 
both sides.  What if the host country does not need to rely on the home country for 
enforcement?  Let us assume, as is sometimes alleged, that the E.U. enforces accounting 
standards less rigorously than the U.S.?  Can IAS and U.S. GAAP nevertheless be 
equivalent?   
 
94 Recital 13, Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, December 16, 2002. 
95 Recital 14, Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, December 16, 2002. 
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One view is: yes.  In this context, perhaps the SEC should not care whether there 
is adequate enforcement Europe, because the SEC can enforce IAS itself.  Unlike the 
PCAOB case and the E.U. Financial Conglomerates case, the SEC need not depend on 
foreign regulators for enforcement.  The SEC only needs to hire some IAS accountants, 
and it will be able to interpret and enforce IAS the same way it interprets and enforces 
U.S. GAAP. 
On the other hand, while there may not be an enforcement problem, there is an 
inconsistency problem.  The SEC may enforce IAS in the U.S. without regard for 
enforcement in Europe, but the effect is to establish two IAS regimes – a U.S. IAS 
regime, and a European IAS regime.  An investor, upon receiving an IAS financial 
statement, is uncertain about how to interpret the statement.  Should she treat the 
statement as if it had been scrutinized under the (hypothetically) stronger U.S. 
enforcement regime?  Or should she assume that the statement was filed in the E.U. 
(hypothetically, the weaker regime), and discount the numbers according?  Recognizing 
this problem, the SEC has announced that before it accepts IAS in the U.S., it will require 
evidence showing that “IFRS are applied and interpreted faithfully, consistently and 
thoroughly across different jurisdictions and across different industrial sectors,” and that 
“IFRS are indeed a single set of international accounting standards and not a multiplicity 
of standards going by the same name.”96 If there are significant disparities in the way 
foreign regulators interpret and enforce IAS standards, the SEC will not recognize IAS as 
equivalent to U.S. GAAP. 
 
96 Ethiopis Tafara, Director, Office of International Affairs, SEC, International Financial Reporting 
Standards and the US Capital Market, Remarks before the Federation of European Accountants (December 
1, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120105et.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006). 
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In the case of the E.U. Financial Conglomerate Directive, there remains a danger 
of inconsistency in a different sense.  Pursuant to the Directive, the decision of whether 
third-country supervision is equivalent to E.U. supervision is left to national regulators, 
as opposed to E.U officials.  This opens the possibility that different regulators may reach 
different conclusions, creating the odd situation that third-country supervision may be 
equivalent to E.U. supervision in one E.U. country, but not in another.  The E.U. has tried 
to address this concern by issuing “general guidance” documents, which make 
recommendations about whether supervision by certain third-countries is equivalent, but 
these recommendations are merely advisory and not binding.97 
2. Lack of Transparency 
 
A second potential pitfall is the problem of non-transparency.  Two examples 
illustrate this.  First, when the PCAOB decides whether to rely on foreign supervisors, its 
determination is not made public.  This is a lack of transparency.  Full transparency 
would require that the PCAOB announce a list of countries for which it will substitute 
foreign inspections for PCAOB inspections.  Second, when the FSA decides whether a 
foreign financial conglomerate is subject to equivalence home supervision, its decision is 
also not made public – instead, the FSA notifies firms through private letters.  Not only is 
this an example of non-transparency, but what is additionally puzzling is that the FSA 
makes equivalence decisions on a firm-by-firm basis rather than a country-by-country 
basis.    
 
97 Thus far, the there are two general guidance documents.  See Third Country Supervision and Equivalence: 
European Financial Conglomerates Committee Essues General Guidance to EU Supervisors on Supervision 
in Switzerland, 06.07.2004;  Third Country Supervision and Equivalence: European Financial 
Conglomerates Committee Issues General Guidance to EU Supervisors on Supervision in the United States 
of America, 06.07.2004, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/financial-
conglomerates/supervision_en.htm (last vistited Feb. 28, 2006). 
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Why not more transparency?  Why not make equivalence determinations public?  
One view is that the PCAOB and the FSA fear public scrutiny.  Perhaps public scrutiny 
would reveal that the FSA and the PCAOB make equivalence determinations in an 
arbitrary, unprincipled manner.  After all, to determine equivalence, a regulator weighs 
several considerations – e.g. whether home country laws are adequate, whether there is 
sufficient enforcement, whether the home country regulator is cooperative – in other 
words, there is no bright line rule.  In practice, perhaps this reduces equivalence to an ad
hoc determination.  This suggests that we should be wary of equivalence.  But the 
difficulty with this explanation is that both the FSA and the PCAOB have promulgated 
detailed rules explaining the criteria used to determine equivalence.98 If the sole concern 
of the FSA and the PCAOB is to avoid public scrutiny, perhaps they would not have 
bound themselves to these self-promulgated rules. 
 Another explanation recognizes that equivalence sometimes involves complex 
negotiations, specifically negotiations among the host country regulator, the home 
country regulator, and the firm being regulated.  For example, in the financial 
conglomerate context, the FSA may accept SEC supervision as basically equivalent, but 
may nevertheless request that the SEC grant it access to certain information pertaining to 
the firm, or require that the firm make additional disclosure directly to the FSA.  During 
negotiations, all three parties may wish to keep communications private, because 
negotiations are more likely to succeed when parties can communicate in confidence.  
Once negotiations conclude, the FSA may continue to keep the negotiation details private 
 
98 See PCAOB Release No. 2004-005: Final Rules Relating to the Oversight of Non-U.S. Public 
Accounting Firms, June 9, 2004, available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket_013/index.aspx (lat 
visited Feb. 20, 2006); Policy Statement 04/20: Financial groups - Feedback on CP204 and Made Text, 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Policy/Policy/2004/04_20.shtml (last visited Apr. 23, 
2006). 
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in order not to jeopardize future negotiations.  Otherwise, if the final terms are made 
public, future firms and regulators may demand terms from the FSA that are at least as 
favorable, putting the FSA in a successively weaker bargaining position.  While this 
second explanation has some merit, it is not completely satisfactory either, because it 
begs the question: why is the FSA making determinations on a firm-by-firm basis in the 
first place?  Shouldn’t equivalence focus on the home country supervisory regime rather 
than the firm?  The FSA would likely respond that there are significant differences 
between financial conglomerates, even financial conglomerates from the same country.  
For example, financial conglomerates in the U.S. may be regulated by different regulators 
– banks are regulated by the Federal Reserve and securities firms are regulated by the 
SEC.  Hence, the FSA cannot make a general equivalence determination for each country, 
and instead, must independently examine each individual firm.99 
A similar rationale may apply to the PCAOB case.  The PCAOB may wish to rely 
more heavily on some foreign supervisors and less on others.  To avoid offending the 
latter group, the PCAOB may wish not to disclose its evaluations of foreign regulators.  
Otherwise, all foreign regulators will demand most-favored status. 
3. Competitive Advantage and Competitive Disadvantage 
As discussed previously, “equivalent” does not mean “identical.”  What if there 
are significant differences between home country regulation and host country regulation, 
but the host country nevertheless deems home country regulation to be equivalent?  If 
home country regulation is less restrictive than host country regulation, then host country 
companies may be at a competitive disadvantage.  If on the other hand, home country 
 
99 These ideas emerged from discussions with Prof. Scott, Prof. Jackson, and other members of the 
International Finance Seminar. 
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regulation is more restrictive than host country regulation, and the host country does not 
allow foreign companies to avail themselves of less restrictive host country laws, this 
may be seen as protectionism.  Protectionism gives host country companies an unfair 
competitive advantage. 
These are not merely theoretical concerns.  In the past, the SEC has justified its 
hesitancy to eliminate the reconciliation requirement on the grounds that the agency does 
not want to place domestic companies at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign 
companies.  In a 1997 report, the SEC explained that if IAS standards are not of 
comparable quality to U.S. standards, “domestic registrants would be put at a competitive 
disadvantage because application of U.S. accounting and reporting requirements would 
impose higher disclosure requirements on them than on foreign enterprises competing for 
capital in the same markets.”100 One fear is that upon finding themselves at a 
comparative disadvantage, U.S. companies may leave the U.S. to reincorporate abroad.  
They may then reenter U.S. capital markets as foreign firms filing IAS financial 
statements.101 
4. The Dilemma of Mutual Benefit and Reciprocity 
Another problem with the equivalence approach is that equivalence does not 
guarantee mutual benefit or reciprocity.  Equivalence does not guarantee mutual benefit, 
because when a host country decides that home country regulation is equivalent, most of 
the immediate benefits accrue to the home country.  To illustrate with a hypothetical, 
suppose that the E.U. decides to recognize U.S. GAAP as equivalent to IAS.  U.S. 
 
100 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on Promoting Global Preeminence of American Securities 
Markets (October 1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/acctgsp.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 
2006). 
101 MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW, 173 (1999). 
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companies may now raise capital in Europe without the added cost of preparing IAS 
financial statements.  European companies receive no direct benefit.  In fact, they may be 
slightly worse off than before due to increased competition for capital.  Concededly, 
European investors benefit from being able to invest in U.S. securities.  Nevertheless, the 
E.U. would undoubtedly prefer that the U.S. extend the same courtesy to E.U. firms as 
the E.U has to U.S. firms.   
But equivalence also does not guarantee reciprocity.  Whatever the E.U. decides 
about U.S.GAAP-IAS equivalence, the U.S does not have to accept the E.U.’s findings.  
It is entirely possible to have one-way equivalence – the U.S. may choose not to accept 
IAS as equivalent to U.S. GAAP, even if the E.U. to accepts U.S. GAAP as equivalent to 
IAS. 
This poses a problem.  The principles of mutual benefit and reciprocity often form 
the basis for international cooperation – a country is unlikely to voluntarily yield to the 
demands of another country without assurance that it will receive some benefit in return.  
In the case of equivalence, it is reasonable to think that a country may be unlikely to 
recognize another country’s regulations as equivalent without assurance that the other 
country will also recognize the first country’s regulations as equivalent.   
If this line of reasoning is correct, for equivalence to have continued success in 
the future, the concept of “equivalence” must be reformulated to incorporate the idea of 
“reciprocity.”  Under the equivalence-plus-reciprocity approach, one country agrees to 
accept a second country’s regulations as equivalent on the condition that the second 
country also accepts the first country’s regulations as equivalent.  To preventing cheating, 
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the first country threatens to withhold its equivalences finding if the second country 
renegades. 
In actuality, equivalence has already begun to evolve into equivalence-plus-
reciprocity.  This is apparent in the case of accounting standards.  One early articulation 
of equivalence-plus-reciprocity was in an April 2004 speech by E.U. Commissioner 
McCreevy, who declared that equivalence “is not a one-way street – it is only reasonable 
for European companies to expect that US regulators will make similar efforts to judge 
the equivalence of our international standards with US GAAP, and once this is done, to 
release companies from the costly burdens of converting standards.”102 In this statement, 
Commissioner McCreevy blurs the line between equivalence and mutual recognition.  
Equivalence no longer means unilateral action; instead, like mutual recognition, it is 
conditioned on reciprocity – the E.U. will recognize U.S. GAAP, only if the U.S. also 
recognizes IAS. 
One difference between mutual recognition and equivalence-plus-reciprocity is 
that the former implies that countries will cooperate with one another, while latter 
suggests that countries may be at odds with one another.  After Commissioner 
McCreevy’s speech, European regulators continued to urge U.S. counterparts to accept 
IAS, but in 2005, the SEC announced in its “roadmap” that it will postpone the decision 
on eliminating the reconciliation requirement until 2009.  Rebuffed, European regulators 
threatened the U.S. with what one U.S. regulator disparaging labeled “reverse 
 
102 Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Competitiveness and 
Growth in the EU through the Development of an Integrated Capital Market and Banking System, Speech 
at the Institute of International Finance, Panel on “Regulation and Consolidation in the Financial Industry”, 
Madrid (April 1, 2004), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/194&format=HTML&aged=1&l
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reconciliation,”103 but what European regulators might characterize as equivalence-plus-
additional-requirements.  The European CESR recommended that even though U.S. 
GAAP is broadly equivalent to IAS, with respect to certain IAS standards that are 
significantly different from U.S. GAAP, U.S. companies should make certain additional 
disclosures.  Only after U.S. GAAP statements are supplemented with these disclosure 
statements will they be deemed equivalent to IAS statements.104 As indicated earlier, U.S. 
regulators reacted negatively.  One regulator called this development a “potential 
speedbump.”105 Another expressed “bafflement:”  
I am baffled at the suggestion by some that Europeans should 
begin to require U.S. companies to reconcile their U.S. GAAP financial 
statements to IFRS.  This runs against the direction that we are taking in 
the United States and undermines our efforts towards mutual recognition.  
Some may assert that this is a useful bargaining chip to ensure that we 
Americans will recognize IFRS. But, I believe that it is counter-productive, 
ignores historical precedent and market practice, and diverts attention and 
energy from solving the real challenges before us. IFRS will stand or fall 
on its own merits. Our efforts should be focused on making sure that it 
succeeds.106 
This last statement demonstrates how equivalence-plus-reciprocity can feel less 
like cooperation and more like strategic interaction. 
In the end, the E.U. will likely not carry out its threat of requiring U.S. companies 
to make additional disclosures.  At least for the short-term, Commissioner McCreevy has 
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indicated that he favors extending the status quo by continuing to permit U.S. companies 
to continue to use U.S.GAAP.107 For the long-term, the solution is still equivalence, but 
there is strong consensus that equivalence will be a bilateral process.  Commissioner 
McCreevy plans to recommend to E.U. Member States and the European Parliament to 
postpone the decision on the possible equivalence of US GAAP with IFRS for two years.  
"Such a postponement,” he believes, “would align the two timetables for equivalence and 
would give both of us the possibility to monitor closely developments in the other 
jurisdiction."108 The suggestion is that any European finding of equivalence will be 
conditioned on U.S. reciprocity. 
The transformation of equivalence into equivalence-plus-reciprocity is still more 
evident in the case of auditor regulation.  As discussed previously, under Sarbanes-Oxley, 
foreign accounting firms that prepare or issue audit reports on financial statements that 
are filed in the U.S. must register with the PCAOB.  Additionally, the PCAOB threatens 
to conduct foreign inspections unless foreign auditors are subject to adequate home 
supervision.  In response, the E.U. is considering a new Directive to improve European 
public oversight over the audit firms.109 The proposed Directive purports to “provid[e] a 
basis for effective and balanced international regulatory co-operation with oversight 
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bodies of third countries such as the US Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board.”110 Furthermore, the Directive requires the following:  
Auditors and/or audit firms from third countries that issue audit 
reports in relation to securities traded in the EU, need to be registered in 
the EU … and be subject to Member State systems of oversight, quality 
assurance and investigations and sanctions….  In order to prevent 
unnecessary international regulatory overlap Article 46 allows for 
exemption from registration, oversight, quality assurance and 
investigations and sanctions if audit firms from third countries are subject 
to equivalent systems of registration and oversight ….  Another important 
obligation is reciprocal treatment of Member States by the third country.  
To have a common EU assessment and, thus, secure equal treatment of 
third countries throughout the EU, the Commission will perform this 
assessment at EU level in cooperation with Member States.111 
There are several points to notice about the proposed Directive.  First, the E.U. 
adopts an equivalence approach.  The E.U. will require foreign auditors to be subject to 
domestic oversight, unless the foreign auditors are already subject to equivalent oversight.  
Second, the E.U. is protesting what it perceives to be an improper attempt by the U.S. to 
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over European firms.  In response, the E.U. threatens to 
assert European jurisdiction over U.S. firms.  This explains why Europe will make its 
equivalence determination at the E.U. level rather than at the national level – separately, 
individual European member states are at a size disadvantage vis-à-vis the U.S.; united, 
the threat of European jurisdiction carries more force. 
The third point is that E.U. regulators have formally incorporated the idea of 
reciprocity into the concept of “equivalence.”  The proposed Directive explicitly states 
that the E.U. will not exempt third country auditors unless there is reciprocal treatment of 
European auditors by the third country.  This is a novel and important development.  
There is no comparable E.U. statutory or regulatory provision in the accounting standards 
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context or in the financial conglomerates context; those Directives were passed a few 
years earlier, when the concept of equivalence was not as well understood.  The proposed 
E.U. auditor oversight Directive signals a formal shift from a pure equivalence approach 
to an equivalence-plus-reciprocity approach.   
V. Conclusion 
 In an earlier era, harmonization appeared the only option for those who advocated 
international financial integration.  More recently, equivalence has emerged as a viable 
alternative.  This paper gave four examples: (1) U.S. and E.U. accounting standards, (2) 
E.U. regulation of financial conglomerates, (3) U.S. regulation of auditors, and (4) the 
U.S.-Canada Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System.  Most of these examples involve the 
U.S. and the E.U., but equivalence is not limited to the trans-Atlantic context.  
Equivalence is currently being applied between the E.U. and Switzerland (for financial 
conglomerates), the E.U. and Canada (for accounting standards), and the E.U. and Japan 
(for accounting standards).  In the future, as the U.S. and Japan pursue closer regulatory 
cooperation112, equivalence may be used there as well. 
 Even as equivalence has become more common, the precise relationship between 
equivalence and harmonization remains a matter of considerable debate.  The dominant 
understanding is that harmonization and equivalence are two distinct concepts.  
Harmonization pushes for rules to become similar; equivalence allows differences to 
persist.  A counterpoint understanding is that harmonization and equivalence are more 
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alike than distinct – like harmonization, equivalence should focus on making rules more 
similar rather than acknowledging persistent differences.  There is a third understanding 
of equivalence, one which rejects altogether the notion that we should focus on legal 
similarities and differences; instead, the market-based test suggests that two regulatory 
regimes that have different legal characteristics may nevertheless be “equivalent” if they 
produce the same economic effects. 
This paper takes the view that equivalence and harmonization are not mutually 
exclusive; instead, they can and ought to be used in combination with one another.  
Nevertheless, there are some situations in which we will want more harmonization, and 
others in which we will want more equivalence. In general, where there is no overarching, 
international political structure such as the E.U., equivalence has the advantage of 
feasibility, flexibility, and being conducive to healthy regulatory competition.   
 On the other hand, proponents of equivalence should recognize and avoid 
potential pitfalls.  Regulators should be careful not to jeopardize investor protection, 
which is the primary reason for having securities regulations in the first place.  Also, 
regulators should disclose their equivalence findings to the public, or alternatively, offer 
reasons for non-disclosure.  They should also take care that equivalence does not distort 
the market, giving some companies an unfair competitive advantage over other 
companies.  Most importantly, regulators must not overlook the importance of mutual 
benefit and reciprocity; otherwise, they risk impasse and stalemate. 
